Did anyone sign the Kyoto Protocol in good faith? New Zealand didn't.

Robin Johnson's Economics Web Page introduces the Kyoto Escalator chart (inspired by the Skeptical Science Escalator chart) and argues that New Zealand was just as complicit as the major European countries in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol so that they complied with it without reducing either gross or net emissions.

The Kyoto Escalator: New Zealand's Gross greenhouse gas emissions (blue) increase by 19%; Net emissions (brown) increase by 23% and 'Kyoto' emissions (red) are less than average 1990 gross emissions. Double click on the chart to see it at 100% and in good resolution.

Professor Dave Frame is the new director of the Climate Change Research Institute at Victoria University of Wellington. He is a University of Canterbury-trained scientist who has worked for some years in Britain. He has just joined the New Zealand climate change fray with a very interesting opinion editorial "International focus needed over climate" in Wellington's Fairfax-owned Dominion Post. Welcome to climate change issues back in New Zealand, David.

David Frame writes that New Zealand does not want to be thought of as the country that reneges on international treaties.

"Reputationally, accepting commitments and then failing to deliver on them is not a look New Zealand likes. "Doesn't honour the treaties it's signed" is not one of the few sentences we want people to remember about us."

So, yes, I agree, New Zealand should honour the treaties it signs. I hate to nitpick but, isn't New Zealand the country that was explicitly founded in 1840 on a treaty that was not honoured? Is our record on international climate change treaties any better?

David Frame describes the history of the Kyoto Protocol climate negotiations

"...the Kyoto Protocol was a no-win situation for places like New Zealand. In the 1990s Britain and Germany were reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases for non-climate-related reasons (declining manufacturing and the collapse of the coal industry in Britain; technological substitution in the case of post-reunification Germany)."

"Kyoto's structure, reductions of emissions by some specific fraction compared with 1990 levels, were designed with this in mind, since it allowed Europe to appear to "take the lead" without actually doing anything very different from what they were going to do anyway. It was an approach so clearly aligned with the near-term reputational interests of some stakeholders that the Nobel prize-winning strategist Tom Schelling wrote of it: 'I cannot help believing that adoption of such a commitment is an indication of insincerity'."

Frame believes New Zealand's negotiators were innocent parties who acquiesced in these machinations while Britain and Germany portrayed themselves as "leaders" on climate change, even though their emissions reductions basically consisted of doing what they were going to do anyway.

While I am a little disappointed that Britain and Germany acted in such a self-serving way, I don't doubt that David Frame is correct about their motives. However, I don't think he is correct to say New Zealand was innocent. On 31 October 2007, the then Minister of the Environemnt Simon Upton gave a speech about New Zealand's negotiating position three weeks before the UNFCCC meeting in Kyoto. All emphasis is mine

Upton stated that within New Zealand's negotiating position, using forest sinks to offset increases in emissions was just as important as the Protocol including international emissions trading, an all-gases approach and prompt acceptance of commitments by developed countries.

"Sequestration of carbon in sinks (such as forests) should qualify alongside emission reductions for the purposes of counting progress towards any targets that are agreed."

Upton contines.

"I want to say why sinks are important - spelling out in broad terms the economic benefits to New Zealand of counting sinks - and explain briefly how New Zealand considers they ought to be treated. Then I want to say why - even though the correct treatment of sinks is both fair in terms of the Convention, and good for New Zealand's economy - sinks nevertheless do not and cannot protect New Zealand emitters of greenhouse gases from adjustment."

"Adding to carbon stocks through afforestation should count positively; reducing stocks (through forest harvest, land clearance and such like) should count negatively."

"If - and I emphasise if - sequestration is treated in the way New Zealand has long been advocating, then the major contribution we expect to make to removing carbon from the atmosphere in future years will earn us 'credits'."

Upton and the New Zealand negotiators got what they wanted. Forest carbon sink credits were included as offsets. However, Upton provided several cautionary notes. If New Zealand's forest carbon credits were recognised in Kyoto, it may be perceived as special pleading. Also fairness suggested that forest owners should receive them, and be able to sell them. As opposed to the Government keeping them for compliance with Kyoto.

"New Zealand's stance on sinks has been treated with scepticism by some because, superficially, it looks as though it may be special pleading by New Zealand to take advantage of our sinks to reduce the pressure on emitters to make adjustments. We do not see it that way. New Zealand has been clear in responding to other countries that we do not see the accrual of sink credits as a way to insulate New Zealand from acting to reduce emissions. We see New Zealand's sink credits being an integral part of the international emission trading market. As such, we see New Zealand emitters facing the world price for carbon emissions provided that price is generated by a free market in emission permits."

"Let me now turn to a related question: why recognition of sinks nevertheless does not and cannot protect New Zealand emitters of greenhouse gases from adjustment. It might be suggested that New Zealand's interest in sinks stems purely from a desire to secure for itself a large buffer that would allow for significant growth in greenhouse gas emissions. That is not the case -- nor do I believe would it be credible to pursue such an objective."

"It would simply not be credible to advocate least cost tradeable mechanisms for the world and then seek to keep New Zealand's forest credits for domestic use only. Sequestration credits should accrue to the forest growers who earn them, and they should be free to place them on the world market."

So Simon Upton foresaw two problems with using the credits from forest carbon sequestration as a buffer to allow growth of GHG emissions. There was the reputational problem of New Zealand's insincere negotiating position in the Kyoto discussions. And there was the problem that the credits should accrue to the owners of the forests, not the Government.

New Zealand's climate change officials solved the "who's credits?" problem by inventing a new 'junk' currency to be issued to the commercial foresters instead of Kyoto units (and to buy off greedy emitters); the New Zealand Unit.

As we can see from the Kyoto Escalator graphic, in spite of gross greenhouse gas emissions increasing by 19% (blue line) and net emissions increasing by 23% since 1990 (brown line), New Zealand is on track to comply with the Kyoto accounting rules (the red line) as the 1990 start point is 'gross' and the 2008 to 2012 target is 'net'.

The real Kyoto forest carbon removal units were kept "off the balance sheet". In the New Zealand Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990 2009 and in the Kyoto Protocol net position report, the carbon sequestration from 2008 to 2012 is estimated from forest surveys. The actual Kyoto removal units will not be recognised until after 2012. It is these as-yet unissued units that offset the 19% increase in New Zealand's gross GHG emissions since 1990.

It seems since Simon Upton's time, we have developed collective amnesia about intentionally negotiating the Kyoto Protocol so that we could rely on forest carbon sinks to buffer increases in greenhouse gases. Has any one of the Kyoto Protocol parties negotiated and acted in good faith? New Zealand certainly hasn't

The Durban UNFCCC international climate negotiations

In which Robin Johnson's Economics Web Page discusses the Durban UNFCCC international climate negotiations through a historic lense of the Second World War and the Rio 1992 Earth Summit.

In a very considered comment on the Hot Topic blog , David Lewis questions whether the Durban UNFCCC international climate negotiations can come up with a binding treaty that effectively reduces greenhouse gas concentrations, given the existing public will.

"I don’t see how negotiations on an international climate treaty can proceed to an agreement that would actually stabilize the composition of the atmosphere at a level that would not cause [dangerous anthropogenic interference] without more demand for such an agreement coming from the global population."

David Lewis compares the global demand for action in the international climate change negotiations with the changing British attitudes to 'Total War' with Hitler's Germany in 1940. Lewis implies that in the climate change negotiations, each government is "trapped in a circumstance where it can’t generate the national will that’s necessary."

In terms of the purposes served by international climate change negotiations, I would go a step further than that thoughtful comment from David Lewis. I say that the negotiations have never had the goal of producing a binding treaty to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations. Governments instead use the negotiations as one of their reasons for not reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and for continuing with 'business-as-usual'.

Let me summarise my contention using another reference to the Second World War.

Q. Whats the difference between Neville Chamberlain's negotiations in 1938 with Hitler in Munich that lead to the annexation of Czechoslovakia and the UNFCCC international climate change negotiations?

A. Neville Chamberlain only went once to Munich.

In making my argument I am influenced by a paper my late father Robin Johnson (as in Robin Johnson's Economics Web Page) wrote in 1992 about the political-economy of the Rio Earth Summit. Robin uses the term "political-economy" to indicate he is considering the various groups with interests in the Earth Summit and asking what interests were served by the outcomes.

Robin noted that the expected outcomes of the Rio Earth Summit were binding signed international conventions on climate change and biological diversity. However, the actual outcome was a "framework convention...full of resounding phraseology and generalities..."

Robin says the reason for this outcome was the fundamental split between the 'North' (developed countries) and South (developing country) blocs. Neither bloc was was willing to put global interest ahead of national interests. Instead, the outcome of the Earth Summit consisted of "...non-binding language ... adopted to get all major nations to sign..."

No agreement except on non-binding rhetorical statements! Sounds familiar, doesn't it? Isn't that what's happened with all the subsequent climate change talks?

Robin's paper uncannily predicts much of the next 19 years of inconclusive negotiations. He wrote "Prior to meeting in Rio, some governments expressed concern that the Earth Summit would become a "pledging conference" where world leaders would be expected to step to the podium and announce their country's contribution." Copenhagen 2009, anyone?

Robin concluded "The challenge for those seeking action will be to channel the outcomes of Rio into concrete action by member states." Substitute "Bali 2007" or "Copenhagen 2009" or "Cancun 2010" for "Rio", and we can re-use that conclusion for all subsequent international climate change negotiations.

So, from a political economy point of view, the climate change negotiations have had the effect of ensuring that international opinion stays "behind the demand curve” for decisive action. After all, that is the function they have served in the 18 years since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.

So I think we need to let go of the idea that the negotiations as they are currently constituted and conducted will make any useful contribution to the kind of decisive international action that is required. We need to accept that the negotiations are just another forum for business and politics as usual.